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Introduction
The Research Workshop on Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Sciences (PBCS) has been running annually for eight years now. Since 
its origins in 2011, the PBCS aims at bringing together young researchers 
from different disciplinary backgrounds: philosophers, cognitive scientists, 
and biologists working on issues of common interest. As a result, it has become 
a reference event in Spain for PhD and early postdoc scholars interested in the 
philosophy of the life and cognitive sciences. The PBCS enhances research 
through the discussion of each session in a friendly and interdisciplinary 
atmosphere intended to debate work in progress. In this issue, we offer a 
selection of the papers presented at the eighth edition of the event, which took 
place in May 2018 at the Complutense University of Madrid.
The topics in this issue range from general epistemic considerations to 
metaphysical concerns in the philosophy of biology. The four selected articles 
are a good instantiation of how classical topics of interest among philosophers 
of biology connect with new philosophical frameworks, developed in the 
light of new empirical evidence and the consequent proliferation of biological 
research fields. The first two papers concern two distinct epistemological issues, 
namely mechanistic explanations and diagrammatic representations, in the 
life sciences. From their different perspectives, both of them address the role 
of epistemic purposes in structuring scientific explanations in the biological 
practices. The following two papers engage with two classical metaphysical 
questions in the philosophy of biology, namely the existence and nature of 
biological natural kinds and the ontological status of biological  individuals, 
in view of recent philosophical theories accounting for new kinds of biological 
entities such as developmental homologues and holobionts.
The article by Emilio Cáceres, entitled ‘Intervals of quasi-decompo-
sitionality and mechanistic explanations’, deals with recent mechanistic ap-
proaches to scientific explanation, which have been especially forceful in the
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 philosophy of biology literature. Cáceres claims that although it is usual 
to characterize science as a process of describing mechanisms, there is no 
consensus among philosophers over what a mechanism is. The purpose of his 
paper is to analyse certain problems arising from classical approaches, and to 
develop a novel, pragmatistic account of mechanisms. After distinguishing 
the main aspects common to most mechanistic views (namely, composition 
by entities and activities, causal role, and organization), the author 
encounters a difficulty met by all of them: the definition of a mechanism 
implies   referring to a specific level of organisation whose relation with 
other levels may be problematic. According to Cáceres, the attempt to 
classify levels of organisation of nature in an exhaustive way through a 
hierarchy of mechanisms entails a variety of problematic issues, such as 
the emergence of   higher-level properties or the problem of downward 
causation. He thus proposes that the particular sciences establish different 
criteria of quasi-decompositionality of systems according to their epistemic 
goals. This is particularly interesting for biological sciences, where each field 
defines its objects of study according to the different levels of biological 
organization. The study of photosynthesis in ecology, plant physiology and 
molecular biology illustrates this tenet. The result of Cáceres’ approach is 
a view of science as a “nesting of boxes” defined at different levels, where 
causal interactions only take place at the fundamental one, but non-causal 
relations between levels can still be established with heuristic purposes.
Javier Anta’s article, ‘Indispensability and effectiveness of diagrams in 
molecular biology’, concerns a dispute that has recently become a matter 
of attention among philosophers of biology, namely the epistemic status of 
diagrammatic representations. In particular, Anta argues that the extended 
use of diagrams in molecular biology is not merely illustrative in purpose, 
but plays an important epistemic role. On the one hand, the author defends 
that diagrams are an indispensable epistemic tool for representing complex 
properties of molecules. Since they are a well-defined, syntactically-behaved 
and semantically-driven means of representation, diagrams are able to account 
for a number of spatial and structural properties that are not always suited 
for translation into natural languages. Against the thesis that diagrams merely 
represent in a visual way those properties that would be too hard to account 
for by linguistic means, Anta argues that some of such properties cannot be 
computationally processed at all. Therefore, complex structural properties of 
biomolecules are necessarily coded in diagrammatic schema. On the other 
hand, Anta also advocates the use of diagrams even in those cases where all 
the represented properties can be computationally processed. He defends that, 
in the context of molecular biology, diagrams are more representational and 
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more inferentially effective than formula-based explanations. He relies on the 
semantic and epistemic effectiveness of these representations, for they make 
relevant information more available than by other means. Importantly, the 
graphical representation of geometric and topological properties makes it 
possible to encode relevant structural information without inflating syntax 
exponentially or losing operational rigor. Finally, the article deals with how 
these epistemic values of diagrams may explain their recurrent and multifacet 
use in molecular biology: in developing several types of explanations (either 
functional-structural, mechanistic-dynamic or topological), in testing novel 
hypothesis, and in predicting new phenomena.
In her paper “How not to resist the natural kind talk in biology”, María 
J. Ferreira Ruiz argues that two major recent criticisms to the conception 
of biological natural kinds as property clusters are ill formulated, since 
they depend on underlying, though unnecessary, assumptions on what a 
philosophical theory of natural kinds should be able to provide. The first 
objection concerns explanatory limitation. According to this objection, the 
cluster approach is flawed because it fails to answer the question of why a 
natural kind is characterized by certain properties rather than others. The 
second objection addresses the inability of property clusters views to fix kind 
membership, and their consequent reliance on independent classificatory 
criteria. Ferreira argues that these two objections rely on the unjustified 
assumption that a philosophical theory of natural kinds needs to provide a 
solution to both requirements. In contrast, she contends that the aim of any 
theory of natural kinds is not to be able to explain why these kinds are as they 
are, neither to fix membership. Instead, the only primary requirement one 
can demand from such a theory is to be able to distinguish natural kinds from 
non-natural ones. While remaining metaphysically agnostic on the true nature 
of biological natural kinds, Ferreira forcefully shows how our very expectations 
from philosophical theories have conditioned this classical debate. 
The ontological status of the symbiotic associations between hosts and 
microbiota has become the source of one of the most lively controversies in the 
philosophy of biology, polarised between those advocating the individuality of 
“holobionts”, and those arguing that these associations have a looser nature, 
analogous to that of ecological communities. In their paper, “A metaphysical 
approach to holobiont individuality: Holobionts as emergent individuals”, 
Javier Suárez and Vanessa Triviño align with the former position, but take an 
original approach that combines new insights from the metaphysical literature 
on emergence with recent debates in the philosophy of biology on the units 
of selection. The authors focus on the most controversial hurdle to understand 
holobionts as units of selection, namely their ability to establish inheritance 
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relations. They argue that, if inheritance is understood on the basis of trait-
recurrence, and given the ability of holobionts to reconstruct their traits 
intergenerationally by recruiting the members of their microbiota, holobionts 
can be conceived as emergent individuals. According to the metaphysician 
Jessica Wilson, higher-level properties of a system are emergent properties in 
a strong ontological sense if they have new causal powers that are not present 
in the lower-level properties upon which they depend. The authors apply this 
criterion to the holobiont case, and conclude that the ability of holobionts to 
sustain trait recurrence belongs to holobionts as emergent individuals, insofar 
as some of their traits have a new, downwardly exerted causal power, that 
determines the relative survival of some of their microbial parts.
The articles of this special issue demonstrate that the proliferation of 
entities and modes of explanation produced by the life sciences in the last 
few decades is followed up closely by young philosophers of biology. The 
heterogeneity of biology is therefore manifested in the philosophical issues 
here presented, showing that evolutionary theory is no longer the only source 
of conceptual puzzles in the philosophy of biology, and that new explanatory 
tools and research objects multiplicate together with different epistemic 
purposes.
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